Regulation of political parties

Abstract

The internal organization of main political parties has come into question in Australia over the second decade of the 21^st century, for not conforming to the same democratic standards that underpin our electoral system. The lack of intra party democracy has been blamed for a high turnover in leaders and political instability. In Australia the original Federal Constitution drafted in 1900 regarded parties as voluntary private organizations, their rules generally unenforceable at law, with patchy regulation of funding and the role of lobbyists. This paper reviews other models such as that of Germany where Basic Law decrees that ‘parties help form the political will of the people’ and ‘their internal organization shall conform to democratic principles’. This paper outlines current problems, highlights deficiencies in the Australian regulatory models using comparative analysis, and concludes with suggestions for reform.

 I. INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY – DEFINITION, ASSESSMENT AND CRUCIAL DETERMINANTS.

 As stated by Cross and Katz (2013), intra-party democracy (IPD) is about the internal distribution of power in political parties, with recent criticisms levelled at hierarchical structures whereby power is centralized at the top amongst a small elite. Some systems display presidentialization of power. Others display a cadre of professionals running the parties and dominating policy. Cross (2013)[i]  reports dissatisfaction amongst rank and file with this increasing concentration.

Assessing the degree of IPD is difficult according to Todi (2014) due to secrecy re party procedures, the divergence between what is in the Constitution and practice, and the fact that few parties have strong enforcement bodies to ensure constitutional adherence. Advocacy of IPD rests on the assumption that more capable and appealing leaders will be elected, more responsive policies formulated, and hence such parties will have greater electoral success.

So how to measure IPD? Three tools have been suggested- candidate and leadership selection and policy formulation. The first two influence the latter so IPD can be described by the following stages:

1. Who can be selected
2. Who selects the candidates and leaders
3. Where does the selection take place i.e. is it centralized or decentralized.
4. Who appoints the selectors and what voting system is used.

As changes in the political system interact with changes in the party system and within parties themselves, IPD evolves.

The political system is affected by changes in the national constitution, electoral system or social changes (declining ideology, and increased individualism. Party system changes usually result from competition. For instance, electoral defect and lead to increases in IPD. However, factors within a party such as factionalism and internal power struggles can lead to IPD reforms. Huntington’s (1968) isolation of criteria affecting how institutionalized a party’s structure is also affects the evolution of IPD – these are adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Such criteria affect candidate and leadership selection. Important in this process is certification or legal rules governing political parties, such as political finance rules, electoral and campaign laws. It is noteworthy that older democracies have less formal codes so as not to infringe on freedom of association, while newer democracies devote more attention to IPD as a reaction to authoritarianism. A second factor in the political landscape is electoral system design as the number of parties can affect IPD. For instance, First Pass the Post systems (FPTP) tend to select candidates with stronger ties to the electorate, whereas those with Proportional Representation can choose lesser known candidates.

The nomination stage is affected by the degree of centralization. Table 1 describes a range of systems from total centralized to decentralized.

Table 1: The degree of centralization of the nomination process

National leadership controls completely

National leadership nominates from list provided by sub-national organs

Sub-national organs nominate from list provided by national leadership

Sub-national organs nominate subject to approval by national leadership

Sub-national organs control completely

Ballot applied to all party members

Source: Rahat and Hazan, in Democracy within Parties (2013)

However, when it comes to the third stage of selection there can be a range of participation which determines the inclusiveness of the process and allows a ranking scale from 1 to 5. These rankings apply to the selection of the leader or candidates in each electorate.

Table II: Inclusiveness rankings

1.      Voters: entire electorate that has the right to vote in general elections

2.      Party members: registered party members only. Some parties let widely open party conventions (also called direct party vote or open primary) decide rather than the parliamentary party. A certain similarity to American primary elections for election candidate selection cannot be overlooked. This method emphasizes participation

3.      Party delegates: representatives selected by party members (e.g. conventions, central committees, or congresses) – called the indirect party vote.  Voting can be restricted to party membership        or achieved through weighing the votes with results of the constituency associations or voting results in the regions in order to ensure representation of regional interests in the political party’s decision on leadership.

4.      Party Elite: smaller groups and committees that were indirectly selected or only the members of the party’s parliamentary caucus decide. The group that makes the decision about who is going to be the next party leader therefore consists of a small number of people. This shows a high level of centralization and low levels of participation and mediation.

5.      Single leader: one leader decides

It is interesting to note that in a very detailed empirical study of IPD and its effects on mobilization, that Sandri (2011) noted that,

“If high levels of intra-party participation of grass-roots members are considered as a desirable trait, as most of the literature on party membership postulates (Scarrow, 1994), then the adoption of open primaries for selecting the party leader could be seen as controversial. The blurred character of membership, as perceived by party members, impacts negatively on their specific support for the party and the latter variable affect directly their levels of intra-party mobilization. According to our data, highly blurred character of membership triggers low levels of specific support for the party and thus low levels of participation. High levels of satisfaction with intra-party democracy, on the other hand, have appositive impact on members’ participation as expected. Thus, on the basis of these preliminary analyses of our data, a highly inclusive electorate for electing the party leader seems to affect negatively members’ mobilization in the end, even though the overall level of involvement in party activities remains quite remarkable compared to the parties active in other European democracies”.

This conclusion may only apply to a total inclusiveness ranking of 1, whereby the entire electorate chooses leaders and candidates but not 2, where only plebiscites of registered party members can select candidates, which could be combined with 4 for selection of the leader – i.e. by the parliamentary party. Types of political parties and their evolution can also affect the degree of IPD. This is because some political parties provide mechanisms to mediate between degrees of centralization and participation. Mediation describes the problem of recognizing, and the process of mediating, the distinct interests in a political party and its organizations. Most political parties consist of different wings, subunits or special groups, which constantly seek to influence the party’s leadership and therefore also the selection process of party leaders. High mediation of different interests would lead to a fair representation and participation of all distinct groups in the leadership selection and as a consequence in the leadership committee, too.

Various consequences can follow from types of selection methods such as the types of leaders selected. For instance, selection by a party elite such as a parliamentary party, tends to produce leaders with long experience in the parliamentary arena. Whereas if mediation dominates the process, with organized party branches getting a bigger role, in a best case scenario leaders enjoy legitimacy but may exclude general membership at the expense of legitimacy.

Mechanisms with emphasis on decentralization clearly shift the balance towards candidates from states or regions and open opportunities for persons outside traditional areas of office to be selected, whereas open selection processes with a high level of participation from ordinary party members tend to lead to the election of the most popular and well-known candidate, often irrespective of the candidates’ level of experience in legislative and party work[ii]. Since the party leadership has no influence on the selection process (such as through mediation of certain interests), even party leaders with rather short parliamentary careers or with no experience in an elective office may be elected.

The opening of internal leadership selection mechanisms to more general participation or democratization has also led to unintended consequences such as to the rise of internal battles between party groups and factions, or even to the phenomenon of candidates taking part in leadership elections without any dedication to the party itself but rather to a single issue that in their view needs to be addressed publicly.

In general, political parties all over the world tend to want to have a wide involvement in their leadership selection, but decisions vary on how to balance different regional, issue-based, and participatory interests. So it is worth considering when a country decides to promote IPD what type of political party exists, how it has evolved and the legal basis that governs its operations.

 

II. TYPES OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR EVOLUTION

There are various ways of categorizing parties such as that of Diamond and Gunther (2001) of five types – elite, mass based, ethnicity based, electoralist and movement. Katz and Mair (1995) assert that a new model has emerged called the cartel party, “in which colluding   parties become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state to ensure their own collective survival”.  This is due to an increase in reliance on public funding (see endnote 5 for a complete description of public funding mechanisms).

Hazan and Rahat (2010) relate the degree of IPD to the type of party, noting that the more electorally oriented or catch all parties might have a higher IPD than the more ideological parties. Parties have often made changes as a result of declining fortunes. Scarrow (2005) has noted increasing IPD in Taiwanese parties as a result of electoral defeat while in Germany, the Green Party started to exclude supporters in order to get more representative policies adopted. Argentinian parties adopted formal rules for internal governance and selection committees as a response to military dictatorships. In Israel seats were reserved to represent districts and social sectors, together with using closed primaries. However, countries such as Portugal, Spain and Germany promoted a high degree of IPD through regulations or constitutional amendments due to suffering from prior autocracies or military dictatorships.

As Scarrow (2005, p.15) points out, it is hard to generalize how democratizing membership will affect electoral success and overall party structure but using characteristics of centralization, inclusiveness and institutionalization we can distinguish five party models, in which IPD can be directly related to the type of model, as described in the table below. [iii]

Table III:  Selected Models of Party Organization and Organizational Tendencies

Type	Centralization	Inclusiveness	Institutionalization
1. Dominant Leader	High	Low	Generally, low
2. Party of Notables	Medium (often stratarchical)	Low	Low to medium
3. Individual Representation	Medium to high	Medium to high	Medium to high
4. Corporatist Representation	Medium to high	Medium	Medium to high
5. Basis Democracy	Low to medium	High	Medium to high

Dominant leader. Parties dominated by a single leader generally construct their appeal around the popularity, perceived integrity, and sometimes financial resources, of that individual. This leader articulates and embodies the party’s programmatic aspirations, and the party may even take its name (or at least its nickname) from him or her. In leader-dominated parties, party organization is often weakly institutionalized, and there may be little concern about promoting intra-party democracy

Leader-dominated parties are not necessarily anti- democratic or anti-inclusive in spirit. In fact, in new and emerging democracies, parties of this type have formed around dissidents who rose to prominence because of their opposition to dictatorships

Party of notables. While the leader-dominated party has become a familiar model, dominant leaders were not so usual when democratic parties emerged in the nineteenth century. Then, most parties were weakly institutionalized, with loose decision-making procedures, comparatively weak legislative cohesion, and ephemeral organizations that were generally dormant between elections. Many of these parties arose out of pressures within a legislature, and they only later developed structures to link themselves with supporters. Rather than organizing around a single charismatic leader, these parties tended to be dominated by a small and self-selected leadership corps, generally consisting of elected officials, leaders from the party’s constituencies (clerics, trade union leaders, and so forth), local community leaders, and party bureaucrats. Power was often dispersed between leaders at different levels, who used informal rules and backroom methods to select candidates and leaders. Whatever the mixture of career paths leading to the top in such parties, one common characteristic of these original “parties of notables” was that they were not concerned about maintaining even the appearance of internal democracy: Their platforms sought the endorsement of social “quality,” not democratic “quantity.”

Individual representation. Toward the end of the nineteenth century some of these parties began to experiment with other organizational forms, largely spurred by the success of the new socialist parties. Socialist and labor parties first emerged outside of legislatures, generally at a point when many of those they sought to represent had yet to be enfranchised. In part because their activities were restricted in the electoral arena, they built up permanent organizations that enrolled and organized supporters between elections in order to foster solidarity with their political cause. In many countries, these extra-election organizations helped create new social-political identities that shaped national politics for years to come. These parties tended to construct organizations in which individual members or group interests were represented in regional and national party conventions.

Corporatist. For many parties, proclaiming a commitment to intra-party democracy has meant enhancing participation opportunities for individual members or supporters. However, empowering individual supporters has never been the only option for parties seeking to build more democratic structures. Some parties have developed what might be called a “corporatist,” or group-based, style of internal representation, in which leaders of interested constituencies have privileged positions within the party. Delegates from these groups (such as church or trade union networks) sit in party councils and act on behalf of their supporters. Members of the represented groups are sometimes considered to be indirectly enrolled in the party as a result of their corporatist representation in it. Examples of parties with this corporatist style during some part of the twentieth century include the U. K’s   Labor Party, Sweden’s Social Democrats, the Austrian People’s Party, and Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party.

More recently, a number of traditionally corporatist parties have begun to downplay group representation in favor of a more direct mobilization of individual supporters. Such changes have come in the context of efforts to broaden the parties’ support base, something that may seem more urgent when traditional constituent groups (like churches and trade unions) show a diminishing ability to mobilize political support. At the same time, in some parties, certain factions have tried to extend the corporatist principle beyond the representation of economic sectors, arguing that democracy requires that other groups should have guaranteed representation in party structures—so as to ensure that a range of voices are heard.

Basis democracy. In recent years, some party reformers have become critical of representative arrangements based on either individual or group rights, and have advocated what might be described as “basis democracy” (after the Green parties’ intentions of representing their party “bases”) or “plebiscitary democracy.” This is a model founded on highly inclusive procedures, such as the referendum (“plebiscite”), which prioritizes broad participation in both deliberation and decision making.

These procedures required them to institutionalize to a much greater degree than they initially intended, because the new procedural focus raised issues that could only be resolved through clear new rules. Reformers in more traditionally organized parties have also attended to some of the ideas of basis democracy, and in some cases this has resulted in the adoption of new procedures, such as party primaries to select candidates, party-wide ballots to select party leaders, or new procedures for settling programmatic issues.

These five organizational models are helpful for understanding the different starting points from which contemporary parties may embark on organizational change, and different directions in which they may head when they seek to promote greater inclusiveness in internal decision making. For political parties, “democratization” means very different things depending on the initial organizational context. To put it most sharply, increasing inclusiveness in a party of notables means something entirely different than it does in a basis democracy party. What differs is not only who is empowered by the change but also what practical steps need to be taken to make democratization work: In a weakly institutionalized party of notables, one of the first requirements for internal democratization may be to establish firm rules about who is eligible to participate—an issue the basis democracy party will probably have confronted already. However, it is only recently that rules and case law have been established to control patronage, ballot access, voting rights, gerrymandering and campaign finance. 

 

III. THE LEGAL STATUS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND METHODS OF PROMOTING INTERNAL DEMOCRACY

As pointed out by Persily and Cain (1999), the crux of the problem political parties pose for judges and lawyers derives from their uncertain constitutional and legal status. Nowhere is it more evident than in the United Kingdom, the United States and in Australia when it was never envisaged political parties would become as important as they are today, and they were considered equivalent to sporting associations and other not for profit organizations. The term party can refer to the parliamentary party, the professional political workers and the party in the electorate. In Australia there are State divisions as well as a Federal division, with different rules regarding who can be in the Executive, and financing arrangements, as well as different Constitutions.

In any jurisdiction however there are two approaches to promote IPD apart from legal or regulatory- and this is advocacy, which is being attempted across many Australian state political party divisions. However due to the reluctance of the cadres or factions that control Australian parties which have evolved into the cartel model, dependent largely on government funding both from State and Federal elections according to the number of votes received and a further administrative formula, many are looking to other jurisdictions that have imposed constitutional regulations for IPD.

The goals of such regulations is aptly expressed in the Spanish Constitution, Article 6, cited by Hallberg (2008),

“Political parties are the expression of political pluralism; they contribute to the formation and expression of the will of the people and are a fundamental instrument for political participation. Their creation and the exercise of their activities are free in so far as they respect the Constitution and the law. Their internal structure and operation must be democratic.”

The internal functioning of parties is legally regulated in many countries as described in the ACE Encyclopedia article on Internal functioning of political parties[iv] (see Table IV below).

Legal regulations may include candidate selection rules; internal elections for leadership positions; or women’s and minorities’ representation in the party leadership for example. Despite this legal acknowledgment of need for democratic culture inside political parties, Norris (2004) notes that intra-party democracy has indeed not been in the centre of the international community’s attention:

“One reason for the relative neglect of the internal life of political parties is that these organizations have long been commonly regarded in liberal theory as private associations, which should be entitled to compete freely in the electoral marketplace and govern their own internal structures and processes. Any legal regulation by the state, or any outside intervention by international agencies, was regarded in this view as potentially harmful by either distorting or even suppressing pluralist party competition with a country.”

Table IV: Intra-party democracy regulations

The state of Queensland, Australia: Electoral Regulation

Belgium: Electoral Law

Finland: Political Parties Act.

France: Regulated for statutory gender quotas in France

Germany: Political Parties Act

Nepal: Interim Constitution 2007, Art. 141 & 142.

Nigeria: The Constitution of Nigeria, sections 221-229,

Portugal: Law Governing Political Parties, Art. 5.

Spain: The Spanish Constitution.

Venezuela: Law on Political Parties (in Spanish),

According to Norris (2004), one of the key issues in intra-party democracy is parties’ nomination processes, in other words who decides and how which citizens are entitled to run for parliament as a candidate of that specific party. Whether such nomination processes are deemed democratic or not, depends on the degree of centralization and participation as discussed in Section 1.0. The more people that are involved in the selection, the more democratic the procedure is. Finally, also the scope of decision-making – number of candidates vying for nomination – is important. The nomination process is governed by law only in a few countries. In most legal systems parties are entitled to decide themselves upon the most appropriate processes and internal regulations. (Norris 2004.)

The above discussion of nomination of representatives holds also when trying to analyze a party’s appointment of its political leader. In a similar way as the principle of fair representation is considered crucial in the relation between voters and the parliament, the representation of and mediation between a party’s different wings and subsections in the leadership positions can be seen as a prerequisite to intra-party democracy.

Finally, in order to enhance parties’ internal democracy, a number of countries have adopted positive action strategies in their legislation in the form of statutory quotas. This means that a certain percentage of nominated candidates and/or elected representatives in each party have to come from a certain gender, ethnic minority or another group. The most common quotas are legal gender quotas which define the minimum percentage of women candidates or representatives a party need to put forth for leadership and/or candidature. Hence factors of mediation can override any rules regarding centralization or participation.

Even though political parties may in some instances have internal democratic behavior regulated or enforced upon them – by constitutional or electoral laws for example – more often than not it is the parties’ own guidelines and rules that set the tone of how important internal democracy should be

According to the comparative analysis of intra-party democracy regulations by Anika Ganja (2006), countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia have been reluctant to impose external regulations on political associations due to strong liberal traditions. In New Zealand the legislation provides for democratic preselections of candidates, but there have never been any recorded attempts to enforce this regulation.

Alan Wall highlights Germany as a good example of intra-party democracy regulations. In Germany, the regulations on intra-democracy were originally enacted to respond to international political pressure to convince the world of the country’s objection to fascism and totalitarianism of all sorts. This resulted in regulations on intra- party democracy regarding party registration, candidate selection and leadership elections which is present still today. (Sundberg 1997, 98-99). Similarly, in Finland, due to fear of Soviet communism all political organizations were regulated by law and communist organizations were banned through the 1917 constitution. Even though the current Finnish political context is very different, both political elites as well as the public have continuously acknowledged the regulations on candidate selection, leadership elections and democratic internal rules which has led to their legal extension over time (regulated currently by the Political Parties Act). In India, the emphasis is put instead on the registration of new parties. Every party which seeks official registration has to agree to uphold the principles of democracy, and it is the duty of the Election Commission to control that party rules do indeed have adequate provisions for intra-party democracy. As for the enforcement of regulations, Sen mentions that one party had to change its constitution after trying to make a founding member its president-for-life. Parties have also been deregistered after failing to hold correct and democratic elections for leadership positions.

Existing regulations for intra-party democracy may in some circumstances be ineffective if they cannot be enforced such as in Ghana and Sierra Leone where the implementing agency (Electoral Commission of Ghana and Political Parties Registration Commission in Sierra Leone) has not attempted to enforce the provisions. One problem is the lack of capacities in the agencies and a second problem is the deviance from democratic culture by political parties. Another example can be found in Nigeria, where intra-party democracy is regulated in the constitution which provides, inter alia, for making leadership elections compulsory for all parties. These procedures are however often disregarded as political “godfathers” remain as central figures in internal party politics. Also when the rules are adhered to, the godfathers have means of circumscribing them, or influence them in order to determine the outcomes in their favor. (IDEA 2005)

Some intra-party democracy regulations related to nominations, leadership or internal decision-making can also be found in Spain, Venezuela, Portugal and Nepal (Gauja 2006). In Australia, so far only the state of Queensland has adopted intra-party democracy regulations in 2002, but the Federal government has refined rules regarding registration of political parties (see Appendix II). Queensland reform were designed to improve transparency and accountability require parties to set out in detail key decision- making procedures, including the election of office bearers and the preselection    of candidates within their constitutions. Although parties are free to choose their method of preselection, it must conform to the ‘general principles of free and democratic elections’. Oversight of this regime is entrusted to the Queensland Electoral Commission, which    may inquire into and undertake audits of party preselections. Parties that breach these provisions are liable to deregistration and consequently the loss of public funding. Recently the NSW division of the Liberal Party was disciplined by the Electoral Commission for failure to disclose sources of private funding – funds for past votes and administrative expenses have been withheld. In this state the Electoral Commission is the regulator in charge of public funding and registration of lobbyists so if the latter infringe rules regarding not assuming an executive role in the party, their activities can be banned for up to five years.

The need for greater transparency and accountability through party laws in Australia has been subject to a lot of recent debate, particularly regarding mechanisms for greater IPD (Gauja, 2006). Table V below allows a comparison with other regulatory regimes governing political parties.

Table V: Comparative Constitutional and Legislative Regimes for the Regulation of Intra-Party Democracy

Country	Constitutional Regulation	Regulation of Party Finance	Regulation of Candidate Pre- Selection	Regulation of other Internal Decision- Making Processes
Australia	No	Yes	No (except Queensland)	No
Germany	Yes—parties may be freely established and their organization should conform to democratic principles.	Yes	Yes—candidates must be selected by a properly-constituted assembly of party members (requirements outlined) by secret ballot.	Yes—German parties law provides detailed rules regarding membership rights, internal order, election of executives, and arbitration of internal disputes.
Portugal	Yes—a party must be governed by the principles of transparency, democratic organization and management and the participation of all its members.	Yes	No	Yes— regulation of names and party symbols.
Finland	No	Yes	Yes—candidate selection must take place by ballot of the membership.	Yes—parties are obliged to have written rules following democratic principles in internal decision-making and governance.
Nepal	Yes—detailed rules regulating party registration.	Yes – but difficulties ensuring compliance.	Yes—must be democratic if codified within the party constitution.	Yes—democratic & periodic election of office bearers.
Spain	Yes – the internal structure and operation of parties must be democratic.	Yes	No—constitutional provisions rarely enforced.	No
United Kingdom	No	Yes	No	No
New Zealand	No	Yes	Yes—Electoral Acts require registered parties ‘follow democratic procedures in candidate selection’. However, there has been no attempt to legally enforce this provision.	No
Canada	No	Yes	No	No
United States	No	Yes	Yes—most preselections take place through statutorily-governed primaries.	No
Nigeria	Yes—provisions regarding party registration and restrictions on formation.	Yes—but rarely enforced.	No	Yes—democratic & periodic election of office bearers.

The discrepancy between Australia and other countries in IPD has led to the following claims regarding its advantages, such as

• Encourages political equality by creating a level playing field in party pre- selections and policy debate within the
• Ensures popular control of government by extending democratic norms such as transparency and accountability to party organizations. It fulfils the legitimate citizen expectation that parties, which receive public finding and effectively determine who will be elected to public office, should conform to democratic principles within their own
• Improves the quality of public debate by fostering inclusive and deliberative practices within parties, creating opportunities for civic participation and political education—conducive to the establishment of a democratic culture within Australian political

As for statutory gender quotas, political parties in Australia set their own rules with the Labor party having quotas and the Liberal Party targets whereas even in Venezuela and Nepal they have been applied to elections, as well as  in Belgium and France and a number of Latin American countries. Ethnic minority quotas are even more exceptional, and they usually apply only to indigenous communities and long-standing national minorities instead of immigrations. (Norris 2004.)

 

 IV. AVENUES FOR REFORM 

Options are legal enforcement necessary, or self-regulation. The democratic election of candidates through party primaries (one member, one vote) has already been introduced voluntarily by parties such as Labor in Britain, by Fine Gael and Labor in Ireland and by Democrats 66 in the Netherlands, a process that opponents of regulation say will engender trust. However, unless IPD can be directly related to electoral success, there are few incentives for its introduction[v].

As Gauja (2006) has pointed out, there are several options for externally enforcing intra-party democracy, with varying levels of intrusion into parties’ existing organizational practices. The most radical of reforms would be to establish a detailed statutory regime that prescribes a particular democratic organizational structure for political parties. Which aspects of a party’s organization and decision-making procedures should be regulated is open to debate, but this could typically include the mandatory introduction of party primaries in candidate preselection (as undertaken in the United States and Iceland). Whilst primaries open up opportunities for membership participation, difficulties arise when considering their administration: for example, who should oversee the process and the costs of supervision?

Gauja (2006, pp 6-7) has summarized a choice matrix between reforms such as those which have taken place in Queensland being extended to all State and Federal regimes but with the choice of just targeting preselections or including internal governance (for example, the election of office bearers). The decision of how best to implement intra-party democracy is could be left to the party, which need not go so far as initiating US style primaries, but which must conform to the principles of free and democratic elections. Enforcement of the regime would be tied to the receipt of public funding, providing a strong incentive for compliance.

Nonetheless, both ‘intra-party democracy’ and ‘principles of free and democratic elections’ are inherently contested concepts. There is no agreement as to whether procedures such as one member one vote elections would provide a more democratic outcome than other forms of decision making, such as party conference although at the very least parties ought to codify how they are governed. The rights of party members with respect to internal decision-making procedures need to be clarified.  At present, whilst there is a requirement to submit a party constitution when registering to receive public funds, pre-selection and party decision-making processes do not need to be outlined in this document. This has left considerable doubt as to the rights and responsibilities that party members actually possess. Therefore, to achieve greater levels   of accountability, party constitutions ought to be made publicly available, and parties should be compelled to disclose details of pre-selection and key decision-making procedures upon registration.

Intra-party democracy is potentially an effective means of increasing political participation, awareness and strengthening the legitimacy of parties as a key linkage between parliament and the electorate. Instances of branch stacking and the appearance    of parties with dubious governance structures (such as One Nation) highlight the need for the external enforcement of intra-party democracy in the absence of electoral incentives. Greater transparency and accountability than that which is currently achieved by limited common law regulation is necessary to ensure that popular control of government is extended to political parties, not simply the contest between them.

 

V. CONCLUSION

Although there is widespread agreement about the role and desirable characteristics of political parties (see Appendix I below), there appears to be no perfect model for building effective party structures. Moreover, it appears to be an adaptive evolutionary process dependent on a number of factors apart from party laws and legal constraints. These include the institutional environment- there can be different electoral systems for different houses of parliament and in different regions, states and federally. Another factor is the communication environment or the extent to which they can rely on mass media. Cultural and historical settings such as the strength of religious groups in Italy and trade unions in labor intensive economies can influence the growth and role of political parties. Also ideology plays a role where a party is formed out of a strong commitment to one idea – whether communism or the environment. But as public opinion shifts in favor of participatory democracy and transparency both established and emerging regimes can come under pressure for IPD. Imitation is also a factor as organizational contagion, which can lead to greater emphasis on IPD, as can electoral success.

Hence we can view sources of change in political organizations along two dimensions

1. Internal including party factions and ambitious individuals, as well as organizational decline or
2. External pressures include changes in party laws and electoral losses.

In conclusion, where disillusionment with politicians and parties is rife, which is appearing with the growth in public funding[vi] and the appearance of the professional political class[vii] in cadre or cartel type parties, together with the growing interest in democratic self-determination, responsive parties may be well advised to be more transparent and inclusive, concentrating on mechanisms to ensure intra-party democracy in order to promote the stability and legitimacy of democratic institutions.

The ACE (2013, p.15) explains the declining interest in being a party member across many old and new democracies as being due solely to these two factors – public funding and professionalization, accompanied by the increasing power of private interest groups providing funding orchestrated by lobbyists:

“These factors have also changed the will of citizens to become party members. The membership in political parties is declining both in new democracies and in the Western European countries that are used to having political parties that are based on a strong membership. In some countries, public funding of political parties is blamed for making parties more an institution of the State than private organizations dependent on their members.” 

 

APPENDIX I: ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND DESIRABLE CRITERIA

(Source: Parties and Candidates, 1998-2013 © ACE Electoral Knowledge Network)

A political party is defined as an organized group of people with at least roughly similar political aims and opinions, that seeks to influence public policy by getting its candidates elected to public office.

Parties tend to be deeply and durably entrenched in specific substructures of the specific society in a sustainable and well-functioning democracy. They can link the governmental institutions to the elements of the civil society in a free and fair society and are regarded as necessary for the functioning any modern democratic political system.

Political parties perform key tasks in a democratic society, such as

1. Soliciting and articulating public policy priorities and civic needs and problems as identified by members and supporters
2. Socializing and educating voters and citizens in the functioning of the political and electoral system and the generation of general political values
3. Balancing opposing demands and converting them into general policies
4. Activating and mobilizing citizens into participating in political decisions and transforming their opinions into viable policy options
5. Channeling public opinion from citizens to government
6. Recruiting and training candidates for public office

Political parties are often described as institutionalized mediators between civil society and those who decide and implement decisions. As such, they enable their members’ and supporters’ demands to be addressed in parliament and in government. Even though parties fulfil many vital roles and perform several functions in a democratic society, the nomination and presentation of candidates in the electoral campaign is the most visible function to the electorate.

To perform the above mentioned tasks and functions, political parties and citizens need some rights and obligations guaranteed or ruled by constitution or law. These include

• Freedom of organization
• Freedom to stand for election
• Freedom of speech and assembly
• Provision of a fair and peaceful competition among parties and candidates
• Mechanisms to ensure plurality
• Inclusion in the electoral process and contacts with electoral bodies
• A level playing field and freedom from discrimination
• Media access and fair reporting guarantees
• Transparent and accountable political finance

The internal functioning of individual political parties is to some extent determined by forces that are external to political parties, such as the electoral system, political culture, and legal regulations. However, internal processes of political parties, such as the personality of leaders and staff, the ideological foundations, party history, and internal political culture are considered to be even more influential on the internal functioning. If a political party would like the democratic principles of electoral politics to be applied within the party, they may consider practices like internal information and consultation processes, internal (formal or informal) rules and structures for the organization and decision-making within the party, and transparency in the party’s functioning at all levels. Party members may also take on more formal roles in decision-making like participating in internal elections for leadership positions or in selecting the party’s candidate(s) in the upcoming elections. Many parties also work actively to enhance the role of traditionally under-represented groups in their parties.

 

APPENDIX II – REGISTRATION RULES IN AUSTRALIA

Source: Research Paper by Laurie McGrath, 2006, Australian Electoral Commission (Queensland), Law Reform and Political Party Registration Case Study – Democratic Labour Party (DLP).

The substantial rewrite of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (the Act) in 1984 saw the introduction of the registration of political parties among the array of innovations to the Australian electoral system at that time. Registration was a necessary requirement to receive public funding and to have a party name on ballot papers. Parties registered at the time of the 1984 Federal election numbered thirty-two. Among those registered was the DLP.

The provisions in the Act relating to registration originated from the 1983 Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform (JSCER). In its report the JSCER recommended the registration of political parties and further recommended that the number of members for registration be 500. The parliament adopted the recommendations and the new Act largely mirrored the report of the JSCER in this area (JSCER 1983:182-194).

In October 2000 and again July 2001 Parliament amended the Act at the request of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). Amendments were sought by the AEC to give it clear and specific powers relating to the registration of political parties and to define more clearly the membership provision and the powers of the AEC. In the amendments in October 2000 the Parliament, during debate in the Senate, moved to further define membership of a party (Bartlett 2000:18253). The amendments sought to provide that a person could only be a member of one party for the purposes of registration. It was designed to prevent a party or parties relying upon the same person or persons for registration.

This amendment was subsequently passed and incorporated into the Act. It became known as the “no overlap rule”. Political parties who are represented in the Commonwealth Parliament are not subject to these provisions under s.124 of the Act.  Parliamentary party is defined in s.123 (1) to mean:“…a political party at least one member of which is a member of the Parliament of the Commonwealth”. The current registration provisions across Australia are set out in Table 1 (ECA 2005).

Table 1: Political party registration requirements Federal and State/Territory in Australia

Jurisdiction	Number of members required	Overlap Rule?	Fee or Cost	Time limits to Register
Commonwealth	500	Yes	$500	No
New South Wales	750	Yes	$2,000	Yes*
Victoria	500	Yes	No	No
Queensland	500	No	No	No
South Australia	150	No	No	No
Western Australia	500	No	No	No
Tasmania	100	No	No	No
Australian Capital Territory	100	No	No	No
Northern Territory	200	Yes	$500	No

* In New South Wales a party must be registered within a year of the election date to be able to stand candidates, have names on ballot papers and receive funding.

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[i]Chapter 7 in Cross and Katz, op. cit

[ii] See: Swart, Brian. Behind Closed Doors or Open Selection Process: Party preference and voter trust in candidate selection (Indiana University, October 2008).  http://www.indiana.edu/~econdept/workshops/Fall_2008_Papers/Swart_Proposal.pdf.

[iii] Table and text from Scarrow (2005) pp. 15-19.

[iv] The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network is the world’s first online resource of its kind in the field of elections and the world’s largest repository of electoral knowledge, providing more than 10,000 pages of specialized thematic information, country and region specific information, comparative data, a global election calendar, the latest electoral news and events, and the real time knowledge services and exchange through the ACE Practitioners Network. The website is available in Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish versions. The ACE Encyclopedia is comprised of 13 topic areas that cover key steps of the electoral cycle in depth. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network publications are independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network or its Partners. To access the online Encyclopedia and for more information, please visit www.aceproject.org.

[v] See Dean Jaensch, Peter Brent and Brett Bowden, 2004, Australian Political Parties in the Spotlight, Report No. 4 for the Democratic Audit of Australia, Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National. 

[vi] Apart from general election campaign purposes and routine operations of the party, funds are commonly earmarked for:

• The work of the parliamentary group/caucus, which may include administrative staff, legislative research, and publications or other information
• Training of party members or candidates in everything from party ideology to membership recruitment and citizen
• Research, including research staff, information material, and opinion
• Party solidarity work in other countries, often in the form of funds provided to a political party foundation to support sister parties in developing democracies.
• Activities aimed to support the participation of under-represented groups such as information campaigns aimed at increasing the participation of national minorities, immigrant communities, young voters, or voters in areas where voter turnout is lower than in the rest of the country.
• Electoral deposits in countries where political parties or candidates have to present a deposit to register for the elections.

• Support for collecting signatures in countries where signatures are a requirement for registration.
• Voter education, which is at times a responsibility of the political parties and/or candidates. If it is, they can often receive funds to cover their costs. In societies where there have been major changes to electoral systems, processes, and procedures and in the case of the newly enfranchised and first time voters, voter education may play an extra important
• Civic education, which may also be a responsibility of the political parties and/or candidates. Civic education deals with broader concepts underpinning a democratic society such as the respective roles and responsibilities of citizens, government, political and special interests, the mass media, and the business and non-profit sectors as well as the significance of periodic and competitive
• Publishing of election manifesto, ideological publications, or party

[vii] Professionalization and membership: ACE (2013, p. 16) notes that “Politics worldwide has morphed from the basic precept of being a field for interested and engaged citizens to represent community interests through government service to increasingly being a field of professionals. There are many reasons for this. Increasingly complex political systems with decision-making processes that nowadays have implications reaching far beyond the country borders put different demands on politicians – demands that cannot easily be met by enlightened and community service oriented citizens. Many commentators also claim that the increasing power of media in election campaigns have sped up the move towards professional politics. Campaigns are more often run by marketing consultants than by local party members, and one minute’s broadcasting on television might have more impact than 100 local meetings and rallies. The influence of political action committees (PACs) and special interest groups that contribute large sums to individual or party-based campaigns should also be considered and recognized in the contemporary political party electoral process.” 

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